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Abstract
Although the exploitation of natural resources has 
been presented as an impetus to economic growth, it 
is often associated with dispossession and deprivation 
of indigenous/local communities with respect to their 
land rights, control of resources, human rights, self-
determination, cultural integrity and the right to 
development. This constitutes a key threat to the social, 
economic and cultural rights of indigenous communities. 
In their struggle to exercise these rights, conflicts are 
bound to emerge, emanating from the gap between the 
way the government and companies conceptualize the 
value of environmental resources and its connection to 
the livelihood and cultural significance of indigenous 
populations. Although the legal frameworks governing 
land tenure and natural resources guarantee the rights of 
indigenous communities to an extent, these rights exist 
only on papers and are not being translated into concrete 
practice that may create positive impacts for indigenous 
communities. We assume that the blame is shared by 
companies who are indifferent to sustaining indigenous 
communities and addressing the negative impact of their 
operations; and by national governments who do not 
commit themselves to ensuring that regulations on the 
protection of the rights of indigenous communities are 
translated into practice. An empirical approach to data 
collection and doctrinal analysis of primary and secondary 
data with a particular focus on the Baka People in Eastern 
Cameroon would reveal how the rights guaranteed 
under these legal instruments are not being translated 
into practice to benefit local communities—constituting 
the root cause of conflicts. The article recommends the 
timely and adequate guarantee and protection of the rights 
of indigenous communities as well as some possible 
ways and procedures through which these rights may be 
adequately guaranteed and translated into practice.
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INTRODUCTION
Natural resources have been shown to be linked to 
the conflicts that have plagued a number of Central 
African countries over the last decades, both motivating 
and fueling armed conflicts (Halleson, 2009). Natural 
resource revenues allocated to catchment communities are 
mismanaged, compromising peace as armed groups buys 
over the legitimate claims of indigenous peoples who are 
discriminated against in natural resource management. 
Even when conflict gives way to a fragile peace, control 
over natural resources and their revenues often stays 
in the hands of a small elite and is not used for broader 
development (United Nations Expert Group, 2006, p.7). 
In consequence, both national and international measures 
to avoid the detrimental impact of resource endowments 
have increasingly been discussed and implemented 
(Mähler, Shabafrouz, & Strüver, 2015, p.3) however with 
little achievements.
Despite being endowed with some of the most 
demanded natural resources in the world, Africa has, 
failed to transform its enormous natural wealth into 
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tangible benefits. Instead, the abundance of natural 
resources has become what some analysts describe as 
a “curse” or a “peace liability” (United Nations Expert 
Group, 2006, p.62), fueling violent conflicts over access 
to, and control of, natural resource wealth (Mähler, 
Shabafrouz, & Strüver, 2015, p.3; Ganesan & Vines, 
2015, p.1). Recent experiences from resource - endowed 
countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and 
Central Africa Republic have demonstrated the critical 
linkage between the exploitation of natural resources and 
violent conflict (Network of Global Agenda Councils, 
2013, pp.6-7). Natural resources promote conflicts 
through three mechanisms: First, resources can motivate 
conflict, as violence results from disputes over the benefits 
or the costs (e.g., ecological damages, and socio-economic 
stress) of resource extraction. Second, natural resources 
provide opportunities for violence by financing warfare. 
Third, resources can cause conflict through indirect 
mechanisms: resources may weaken political institutions 
and impair the effectiveness of public bureaucracy, as 
they increase the incentives for corrupt behavior (Mähler, 
Shabafrouz, & Strüver, 2015, p.5).
In the United Nations Secretary General’s seminar 
report to the General Assembly and the Security Council 
in 1998 on the causes of conflict and the promotion of 
durable peace and sustainable development in Africa, 
among the key factors identified as fueling conflict was 
the illegal exploitation of natural resources (United 
Nations Expert Group, 2006, p.62). In 2005, in the 
Secretary-General’s progress report to the 60th session of 
the General Assembly on the 
Implementation of the recommendations contained in the above 
report, the Secretary-General reiterated that illegal exploitation 
of natural resources in conflict-prone and conflict-ridden 
countries continued to be one of the contributory causes of 
conflict and of its recurrence and cited the example of Angola, 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone and 
Liberia, where natural resources had provided major funding for 
the perpetuation of wars. (Ibid.)
Moreover, the Security Council in a resolution1, 
recognized the link between the illegal exploitation of 
natural resources, the illicit trade in such resources as one 
of the factors fueling and exacerbating conflicts in Africa, 
and in particular in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC).The international community has indicated its 
support of efforts to address this critical issue. The Group 
of Eight (G8) countries stated their intention to support 
Africa’s effort to build a peaceful and stable Africa and 
in particular to prevent conflicts and ensure that previous 
1 S/RES/1635 (2005) on strengthening the effectiveness of the 
Security Council and the role of civil society in the prevention and 
resolution of armed conflict, particularly in Africa. In 2000, the 
Security Council authorized the creation of a Panel of Experts on the 
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth 
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo which issued several 
periodic reports.
conflicts do not emerge by “acting effectively in the UN 
and in other fora to combat the role played by ‘conflict 
resources’ such as oil, diamonds and timber, and other 
scarce natural resources, in starting and fueling conflicts” 
(United Nations Expert Group, 2006, p.8).
Although natural resource exploitation has been 
presented as an impetus to economic growth, the 
consequences on catchment communities have been 
alarming. Often, the blame has been laid on governments 
and companies perceived as indifferent to sustain 
communities and addressing the enormous negative 
impact of their operations. This view is well presented in 
the media, civil society and international organizations 
(Mensah & Okyere, 2014). Cameroon, like some other 
Central Africa countries has been beset by a number of 
conflicting claims regarding rights over the management 
of natural resources, leading at times, to loss of ancestral 
lands, inter-ethnic conflicts, damages and loss of property, 
lives, and the aggravation of the poverty situation in rural 
areas (Amungwa, 2011).
It has been asserted that insurgent groups are more 
likely motivated by control over resources (Halleson, 
2009, p.48; Ganesan & Vines, 2015, p.1). The civil wars 
in Angola, Colombia, DRC, Liberia, and Sierra Leone 
are often cited as examples of this dynamic. In Angola, 
the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
(União Nacional Paraa Independência Total de Angola, 
UNITA) financed its war largely through illicit trade in 
diamonds from the mid-1990s until the war ended in 2002, 
while the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra 
Leone also financed itself by trading in illicit diamonds. 
In the DRC, control of diamonds and timber has been a 
powerful incentive to prolong the country’s vicious civil 
war (Ganesan & Vines, 2015, p.2) likewise Liberia. 
Communities are demanding recognition of their 
rights, entitlements and their livelihood. There are indeed 
tensions, conflicts and/or disputes on the risks, impacts and 
distribution of benefits (Mensah & Okyere, 2014, p.70). 
The tensions result from an individualistic pursuance of 
self-interest which leads to compromise the interest of 
others. The divergent of interests and perceptions widens 
the “cleavages” (Ibid). Failure by governments to translate 
policies on the rights of indigenous and local communities 
into concrete practice has seen the emergence of rebel 
groups by those who have legitimate claims but lack the 
means of enforcing them, fueling conflict and human 
rights abuses.
Peoples identified as indigenous are often the most 
discriminated and marginalized; their entire culture and 
identity can be put at risk when their lands and resources 
are lost. Discussions on the rights of indigenous peoples 
in Central Africa are contentious, with some African states 
denying indigenous peoples exist at all, or claiming that 
all Africans are indigenous. In either case, the reality on 
the ground is that these communities’ culture and their 
physical survival is at stake and policy and law reforms 
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must therefore take special measures to address the 
discrimination they face (Pritchard et al., 2013).
Since the research does not seek to present statistical 
analysis, a qualitative dimension was preferred. Data was 
collected from primary and secondary sources. Qualitative 
method was adopted for the collection of data from 
selected indigenes of the case study area and NGOs. Semi-
structured informal interviews were conducted to obtain 
information for the study. In addition, the research involved 
theoretical discussion and analysis of existing secondary 
sources which were reviewed to provide a theoretical and 
conceptual understanding and to aid the discussions.
1. POLICIES ON NATURAL RESOURCES 
IN CAMEROON AND CONCEPTUALISING 
NATURAL RESOURCE CONFLICTS
This section examines policies on natural resources in 
Cameroon, whether they recognize and guarantee the 
rights of indigenous peoples. It also attempts to show 
how natural resource-driven conflicts emanate from 
the inequality existing in the relationship between 
governments and companies on the one hand and 
indigenous communities on the other.
1.1 Policies on Natural Resource and Indigenous 
Communities’ Rights in Cameroon
Cameroon has national legislation governing land and 
other natural resources, with an aim toward encouraging 
commercial investment in its land and natural resource 
sectors. These laws recognize and guarantee very limited 
protection to the rights of indigenous peoples.
1.1.1 Forestry and Wildlife Law
Cameroon’s  current  fores t  legis la t ion includes 
opportunities for forest communities to register rights 
to community forests and enter into agreements 
regarding their management (Oyono, 2005, p.1)2. The 
forestry legislation outlines the transfer of management 
responsibilities and powers to the local communities, 
which were perceived by the local communities as a 
response to the environmental injustice and to their 
historical frustrations (León et al., 2012, p.195; Mogoi 
et al., 2012, p.182; Monterroso & Barry, 2012, p.136; 
Larson & Pulhin, 2012, p.103; Larson & Dahal, 2012, 
p.77)3. The legislation includes several benefit-sharing 
provisions intended to ensure that forest communities 
and local governments benefit from forest resources. The 
1994 Forest Law introduced annual forestry royalty (AFR) 
40% council, 10% local community, 50% state treasury. 
But the intended benefits are not reaching communities, 
in part because community management committees have 
often been hijacked by special interests and communities 
2 See Articles 37, 38, 54, 67 and 68 of the 1994 Forestry Law. 
3 Ibid., p.2. 
do not have sufficient decision making roles4 or the power 
to enforce their rights.
Also, in Cameroon, forests are state-owned and forest 
communities retain only user rights in forests (though 
these can be restricted by the government) and can acquire 
forest management rights if they are able to navigate 
the complex procedures for establishing a community 
forest (Pritchard et al., 2013). Hence, the law on forest 
concessions discriminates against indigenous peoples5.
1.1.2 Mining Law
Under the mining code, the population affected by any 
mining operation has the right to compensation whose 
amount is deducted from the ad valorem tax and tax on 
the extraction of quarry materials6. Revenue obtained 
from ad valorem tax and tax from extraction of quarry 
materials is divided and assigned as follows: 25% for the 
population affected, 10% for local population and 15% 
for the local council7. However, the modalities for the 
allocation of the share for local population and councils 
will be defined by a joint order of the minister in charge 
of mines and minister in charge of finance8. However, in 
July 2014, a prime ministerial decree9 amended certain 
provisions of Decree No. 2002/648 / PM of 26 March 
2002. According to the amendment, the share of ad 
valorem or extraction tax destined for councils and local 
communities will be henceforth transferred to the account 
of the municipal treasurer according to the new provision. 
Despite the efforts made in modifying the law, there are 
still unanswered questions since there is no clarity on 
how the share allocated to local communities will be 
handled once the transfer of the revenues has been made 
to the account of the municipal treasurer. The lack of an 
operational regulatory framework raises difficulties of 
effectively monitoring sub national transfers and use in 
Cameroon. It is imperative to harmonize the approach and 
modalities for payment and management of sub national 
Revenue transfers in Cameroon.
4 USAID, Cameroon - Property Rights and Resource Governance, 
USAID Country Profile, 2011, p. 2.
5 Centre for Environment and Development (CED), Okani, 
RéseauRecherche Actions ConcertéesPygmées (RACOPY), 
[Research Network for Planned Pygmy Actions], Association pour 
le développement social et culturel des Mbororo (MBOSCUDA), 
[Association for the social and cultural development of the 
Mbororo], International Working Group for Indigenous Affairs 
(IWGIA) and Forest Peoples Programme (FPP), “The rights of 
indigenous peoples in Cameroon: Supplementary report submitted 
further to Cameroon’s third periodic report”, 54th ordinary session, 
Presented to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, October 2013, Banjul, Gambia, p.5.
6 Art 89 of Law no. 001-2001 of 16 April 2001 on the Mining Code.
7 Art 137 of law no. 2002/846 PM of 26 March 2002 on the 
application of the 2001 Mining  Code.
8 Art 137 (2), Ibid.
9 No. 2014/1882 / PM of 4 July 2014. Following this decree, Article 
137 (2) which hitherto provided for a joint ministerial order to 
clarify modalities for the transfer and use of mining royalties was 
modified, completely dropping the requirement for a joint ministerial 
order to regulate mining royalty transfer and use.
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1.1.3 Land Tenure Law
Cameroon’s primary land law10 established land tenure 
rules. A companion law11, addressed the governance of 
state land. These laws created a tenure system based on 
land registration according to which all privately-owned 
land must be registered and titled to retain its character as 
private land. All unregistered land is deemed to be either 
public land, which is held by the state on behalf of the 
public, or national land, which includes unoccupied land 
or land held under customary law. The government can 
convert national land into state land and allocate use rights 
to it (e.g., forest, mining and agriculture concessions) 
or convert it to private ownership (e.g., for urban 
development). Land tenure for most people in Cameroon 
is therefore insecure12.
The laws were intended to encourage foreign 
investment in Cameroon as they effectively clarified 
private property rights and made all unregistered land 
available for investment. Article 16 of Ordinance No. 
74-1 established Divisional-level Land Consultation 
Boards, and Decree No. 78/263 1978 established 
prefect-level Commissions for Resolving Agro-Pastoral 
Conflicts. Decree No. 2005/481 governs land titling and 
registration. 
Land is the key natural resource that communities 
possess and exploit to earn a living but when the land 
is privatized it passes into the hands of people whose 
priority is to make money (Amungwa, 2011, p.55). 
Cameroon’s land tenure system makes indigenous 
populations groups vulnerable to land grabs (Wily, 2011, 
p.5). Land legislation enacted after independence did 
not only retain various European ideas and concepts of 
property, but also diluted them with certain notions which 
have been at variance with the indigenous land tenure 
principles because due consideration was never given to 
the indigenous system (Ibid., p.55).
Cameroonian law or practice does not also make 
it easy for customary land-owners to formally register 
their holdings to secure their property. Registration in 
Cameroon is a remote, complex and expensive process 
and limited to lands which have been cleared or cultivated 
or physically settled with houses (Ibid.). The United 
Nations Expert Group urged Cameroon to speed up 
the process of land reform, to guarantee the right of 
indigenous populations groups and small-scale producers 
to ancestral and community lands and to ensure that 
obstacles to land ownership, in particular those faced 
by women, are removed (United Nations Expert Group, 
2006, p.13). By securing community land tenure rights, 
countries can: reduce conflict and the risk of conflict; 
10 Ordinance No. 74-1 of 6 July1 974 fixing land regulation in Cam-
eroon.
11 Ordinance No. 74-2 of 6 July 1974 fixing state lands regulation in 
Cameroon.
12 USAID, op. cit., p.3.
improve resource security; secure and maintain natural 
resource wealth and biodiversity for future generations 
through sustainable resource management; etc. (Pritchard 
et al., 2013, p.11).
1.2 Conceptualising Natural Resource Conflicts: 
A Governments /Compan ies - Ind igenous 
Communities Interface
In Central Africa, It has become difficult for companies to 
coexist with indigenous communities whose livelihoods 
are intrinsically connected to the land they live on as they 
refute and demand abrogation of large-scale projects on 
their land (Mensah & Okyere, 2014, p.64). This seeming 
incompatible coexistence has generated differences/
conflicts between the companies and local communities. 
Companies are therefore accused of exacerbating conflicts 
through their operations and activating latent disputes. 
These conflicts concern livelihood security, access to the 
resources, ownership, environmental effects, impact on 
social cohesion, cultural beliefs, human rights violations 
and distribution of risks and benefits (Ibid., p.66).
Predatory extraction of natural resources by foreign 
companies in exchange for short-term gain for a narrow 
segment of the country’s elite raises questions as to 
whetherpolicies address the social and environmental 
impact of resource extraction13. Poor, indigenous, and 
marginalised, communities are usually excluded from 
decision-making (Paudel, Monterroso, & Cronkleton, 
2012) and property right in the great wealth being drawn 
from their lands, yet they are nevertheless subject to its 
destructive economic, cultural and environmental impacts 
(Szablowski, 2007, p.18), The granting and exercise 
of new community rights, namely, management rights 
and market rights, are not synonymous with improved 
livelihoods, despite initial predictions and expectations 
(Oyono, Biyong, & Samba, 2012).
Companies and communities are placed on unequal 
scales. Companies wield considerable resources (legal, 
financial) both in size and potency whiles communities 
are poor and weak causing them to oppose natural 
resource operations. In certain instances, companies 
have insisted these suggestions from local groups are 
misguided and instigated by environmentalists who blind 
their eyes to what natural resource exploitation present 
to these communities (Mensah & Okyere, 2014, p.66)14.
Yet some sources assert that these conflicts are intensified 
by companies. For instance, a campaign group Global 
Witness alleges in a new report and reiterated by BBC 
13 Network of Global Agenda Councils, op. cit., p.7.
14 See also R. Wilson, “The Global Mining Initiative” (2000) 8:3 
ICME Newsletter. Cited by D. Szablowski, op. cit., p.77. When he 
said: There is a feeling within the mining industry that it is losing 
an important battle for public opinion. One senior industry figure 
argues that mining has fallen “into increasing public disfavour”, that 
it is seen at best as “a necessary evil” and as “incompatible with sus-
tainable development”.
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that European timber companies have helped fund the war 
in Central African Republic through lucrative deals with 
militia groups (BBC, (2015). Global Witness accuses the 
EU of failing to stop imports of illegal timber to Europe. It 
is also said that timber companies from France, Lebanon 
and China paid more than $4m (£2.5m) to rebels in 2013, 
mainly for protection services (Ibid.).
The relationship between natural resource and conflict 
was triggered by the conception of the “resource curse”15 
in the early 21st century which gained momentum in many 
developing countries where research undertaken revealed 
that natural resources such as gold, oil, diamond and 
other minerals have contributed to instability, war and 
degradation (Mensah & Okyere, 2014, p.68). Conflicts 
occur because both companies and communities place 
different socio-economic values on land (Ibid.) and 
monetary contribution makes an insignificant contribution 
to the loss of land (Ibid., p.59). In effect, natural resource 
driven conflicts stem from the big gap between the way 
governments and companies conceptualize the value of 
natural resources and its connection to the land, livelihood 
and cultural significance of community members who have 
emotional and historical links to the land. The following 
sub-sections further examine the cost of natural resource 
exploitation on indigenous catchment communities.
1.2.1 Dispossession and Deprivation of Land Rights 
and Loss of Control of Resources
Ownership and use of land and natural resources are 
defined and regulated by land and resource tenure systems. 
Land tenure systems are based on written policies and 
laws, unwritten customs and practices or a mixture of 
both (Pritchard et al., 2013, p.8). Tenure security provides 
guarantee against arbitrarily deprivation of rights over 
lands and resources (Ibid.). Indigenous land-tenure systems 
have evolved over the centuries and are often “communal” 
(Manger, 2005; Gausset & Whyte, 2005, p.141). The local 
populations are regarded as the legitimate owners of the 
forest according to customary law (Mbarga, 2005, p.116). 
This is why the 1994 forestry law of Cameroon recognizes 
their role in the management of forest resources by making 
provision for community forest16 and their right to use 
forestry products such as firewood, Non Timber products, 
medicine and food (Ibid., p.117).
Protected area initiatives have led to fundamental 
changes in local livelihood, displacing community 
participation in natural resource management, culminating 
in to conflicts with indigenous peoples who depend on 
forests for their livelihoods (Elías, 2012). Indigenous 
peoples and other local communities have gained little 
15 The “resource curse” argues that countries endowed with abundant 
mineral and natural resources, expected to witness immense 
economic and social progress, sadly, have only experienced 
economic troubles, social instability and authoritarian and conflict 
ridden issues.
16 See articles 37 and 38 of the 1994 Forestry and Wildlife Law. 
from state territorialisation of forest control, except 
sometimes temporary employment as skilled or unskilled 
labourers on lands they have once controlled (Larson & 
Pulhin, 2012, p.105).
Insecure community tenure rights over land and 
resources can lead to conflict when competing users 
fight for control over these resources. Conversely, clear 
and secure tenure rights, and the responsible governance 
of tenure rights, promote development that can help to 
eradicate poverty and protect biodiversity (Pritchard et 
al., 2013, p.8). The growing demand for land and natural 
resources makes the need to strengthen indigenous 
communities’ tenure rights over forest lands and 
natural resources even more urgent (Ibid.). The African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in 2010 
issued a landmark decision in the case of the Endorois 
people against Kenya, demonstrating a clear understanding 
that denying community land tenure security violates 
human and indigenous peoples’ rights17. The African 
Commission found in the Endorois’ favour that there had 
been a violation of Articles 14 (right to property), 21 (right 
to free disposition of natural resources, and restitution and 
compensation for dispossessed peoples) of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ibid., p.9, 11).
The ruling in the Endorois case18 underscores the 
importance of securing community land tenure rights 
as the foundation of a more promising, sustainable and 
rights-based approach to development (Ibid., p.11). The 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(which implements the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights) emphasised that communities should 
not be viewed as passive beneficiaries of development 
processes, but rather as active stakeholders in development 
policies (Ibid., p.10).
1.2.2 Self-Determination and “Free, Prior and 
Informed Consent” (FPIC)
Conflict is also deeply rooted in struggles for indigenous 
people’s rights to self-determination and the demand for 
FPIC from indigenous peoples before natural resource 
exploitation projects can proceed on their lands (Mensah 
& Okyere, 2014, p.71). There is the emergence of the 
international indigenous movement and its support of local 
claims for self-determination in the face of government 
attempts to appropriate land and resources (Szablowski, 
2007, p.38).
17 The decision is available at http://www.achpr.org/files/ses-
sions/46th/comunications/276.03/achpr46_276_03_eng.pdf
18 In 1973, the Endorois community was dispossessed of its ancestral 
lands—Lake Bogoria, located in the heart of Kenya’s Rift Valley, 
was to become a wildlife reserve. Severing the Endorois’ ties with 
their ancestral land not only threatened their socio-economic well-
being, but also their spiritual and cultural survival as an indigenous 
people. The failure to consult the community or involve them or to 
compensate the community with adequate grazing land following 
their eviction severely depleted the livestock of the herding 
community.
18Copyright © Canadian Research & Development Center of Sciences and Cultures
Translating Policies on the Rights of Indigenous Communities Into Concrete 
Practice to Mitigate Conflicts Over Natural Resource Exploitation in Central 
Africa: Case Study of the Baka People in Eastern Cameroon
1.2.3 Cultural Integrity and the Right to a Healthy 
Environment
The takeover of lands belonging to indigenous peoples 
has led to the loss and destruction of their sacred shrines 
and other cultural values. In the Endorois case, the African 
Commission also found in the Endorois’ favour that there 
had been a violation of Article 17 (right to culture), of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Pritchard 
et al., 2013, p.9, 11). Also, natural resource exploitation 
is destructive and causing irreversible damages. The 
environmental effects of natural resource exploitation 
such as mining consist of the removal of large tract of 
forest cover and productive top soil, leaching in water 
bodies (Mensah & Okyere, 2014, p.67), uncontrolled 
logging causes climate change, etc..
1.2.4 The Right to Development
African states are bedeviled with corruption, the 
oppression of minorities and indigenous peoples, and 
unequal development (Szablowski, 2007, p.37). In 
the Endorois case, the African Commission found in 
the Endorois’ favour that there had been a violation of 
Article 22 (right to development) of the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Pritchard et al., 2013, 
p.9, 11). The Bake people in Eastern Cameroon have the 
same plight. The natural resource industry has taken the 
“devil may care” attitude to the impacts of its operations 
(Ibid., p.11, 67-68). Factors such as poor communication, 
broken promises and lack of working agreements between 
governments/companies and communities intensify 
conflicts. In the Endorois’ case, the community did not 
want to close the existing wildlife reserve. Instead, it 
sought a greater stake in its management as well as the 
opportunity to improve the caretaking of Lake Bogoria’s 
ecosystems in accordance with the community’s 
traditional knowledge. Meeting ecosystem conservation 
objectives and maintaining an associated tourism industry 
that is dependent on the reserve is therefore perfectly 
compatible with this legal victory and securing the land 
rights of the Endorois (Ibid., p.10).
2. PECULIARITIES OF THE PROBLEMS 
FA C E D  B Y T H E  B A K A P E O P L E S 
AND MAJOR DIFFICULTIES TO BE 
OVERCOME IN CENTRAL AFRICA
In the face of natural resource exploitation, the Baka faces 
particular problems. This part of the contribution looks at 
these problems and the major difficulties responsible for 
the natural resource “curse” that need to be overcome.
2.1 Case Study of the Baka People in Eastern 
Cameroon: A Diagnose of Natural Resource-
Related Problems
Natural resource exploitation has been clearly understood 
as damaging and affecting the livelihoods of catchment 
communities. This is quite apparent with the Baka peoples 
in East Cameroon. This case study has been chosen 
because it provides a context for understanding the 
relationship between natural resource exploitation and its 
impacts on the indigenous communities in Cameroon. It 
directly responds to the question of how natural resource 
exploitation affects indigenous communities and how 
their respond in the complex system of natural resource 
management has yielded little or nothing. Taking the Baka 
peoples as a case study, it shows that there is no specific 
national legislation on the rights of these peoples and that 
the limited protection granted them under natural resource 
legislations are not given effect to or are not translated 
into concrete practice, thereby leaving these people at the 
mercy of predatory resource exploitation.
2.1.1 Brief Presentation of the Baka Peoples
The Bakas19 are located in the Equatorial rainforest 
of  South-East  Cameroon.  Like other catchment 
communities20, the Baka are natural resource catchment 
people, and find themselves in precarious situations, 
facing numerous problems in the face of natural resource 
exploitation by virtue of their way of life, geographical 
situation and cultural characteristics. The Baka previously 
was hunting, farming, fishing and foraging based 
community, using local and primitive methods for home 
consumption and subsistence farming; and the people’s 
daily life circulating around the use of land and natural 
resources (Nodem, Bamenjo, & Schwartz, 2012, p.11)21. 
The land in which they undertake their hunting and 
agricultural activities remains the most important resource 
for them as they perceive it as being critical to their 
cultural, social and economic survival.
2.1.2 Peculiarity of Their Problems
Like other indigenous communities in Central Africa, the 
Baka in Eastern Cameroon are grappling with problems 
that are peculiar to them. 
2.1.2.1 Absence of Social Amenities: Schools, Hospitals 
and Development Projects
Basic social amenities and other projects are not 
accessible to the Baka. Investigation shows that schools 
and hospitals are not closer to the Baka. There is generally 
the absence of sustainable development projects. The 
19 The Baka people, known in the Congo as Bayaka (Bebayaka, 
Bebayaga, Bibaya), are an ethnic group inhabiting the southeastern 
rain forests of Cameroon, northern Republic of Congo, northern 
Gabon, and southwestern Central African Republic. They are 
sometimes called a subgroup of the Twa, but the two peoples are not 
closely related. Likewise, the name “Baka” is sometimes mistakenly 
applied to other peoples of the area who, like the Baka and Twa, 
have been historically called pygmies, a term that is no longer 
considered respectful. They are mainly concentrated in Cameroon 
and represents roughly 30,000 individuals. Wikipedia, the free 
encyclopedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page.
20 The Bagyéli, Bakola and Bedzang peoples. The Mbororo peoples 
also refers to as they are pastoralists, also belong to the indigenous 
communities.
21 See also USAID, op. cit., p.6.
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chief of the village and their representative in the Annual 
Forest Royalty management committee explained that 
although they had asked for the construction of a village 
school and a health center, neither of the projects had 
been funded22. When Capam paid a mandatory visit to the 
Baka Chief, they were distributed hats, but their request 
for a school was ignored. In their own words, “Nous 
sommes abandonnés à nous–memes” (we are abandoned 
to ourselves)23. Paved roads, improved healthcare 
facilities, schools, electricity and communication services, 
agriculture and husbandry education and potable water 
which are lacking need to be brought to these people. 
Nicolas YANA an indigene of Baka in a video cried out 
that: 
schools are far from us. Our children move for about 2 to 3 
km to molundo where schools are located. We need to go to 
moloundou for treatment, sometime because of the distance; our 
children and wife die on the way before reaching the hospital.
2.1.2.2 Absence of Development Institutions (Rural 
Council and Chefferrie)
The Baka people also expressed concerns about the 
creation of councils and “chefferrie” that could bring 
development to them. Nicolas— a Baka indigene cried 
and painted a gloomy picture of their marginalization 
when he said: “The Bantu always underestimates us; we 
do not have chiefdoms; no municipal councils. Since the 
Bantus have all these they look down at us; we need all 
these development institutions”.
2.1.2.3 Dispossession and Deprivation of Land Rights 
(Ownership Over Land and Natural Resources in the 
Baka Community) and Loss of Control of Resources
Findings show that there is the continued denial of the 
rights of the Baka to own, control and enjoy their lands 
and natural resources. The government does not provide 
adequate protection to these vulnerable indigenous 
peoples nor recognize their rights, which are linked to 
their status as indigenous peoples under international law. 
The land ownership legislation in force does not take into 
account the traditions, customs and land tenure systems 
of indigenous peoples, or their way of life. The Baka – 
the original natives of the region, since the introduction of 
reserves, timber and mining companies to the region, have 
felt their access to their traditional forest shrinking. The 
Baka’s original ability to freely roam the forest in search 
of food has evaporated. They have a muddled perception 
of the mining occurring around them (Steven, 2015, p.22).
The creation of reserves and parks and the allocation 
of timber and mining concession simply a huge takeover 
of hunting and agricultural land previously cultivated 
for domestic purposes, affecting the livelihoods of the 
Baka community. As per agreements and contractual 
issues leading to the commencement of natural resource 
22 Ibid., p.54.
23 Reunion mboy II.
exploitation by companies, all the lands in the area are 
under concession and companies possess the legal right 
to demarcate it for any natural resource exploitation 
related activity. Based on this concession, companies 
hold the right to acquire any previously occupied land 
and to resettle or compensate the affected group under 
already documented rules and guidelines satisfying to 
all parties and interest groups but which are never well 
implemented.
What has generated agitations and conflict is the fact 
that companies have taken over large portions of land, 
installed equipment and fenced the explorative areas to 
prevent any encroachment on the area. By implication, 
most of the lands belong to these companies. The effect 
has been the loss of productive agricultural and hunting, 
fishing and foraging land for indigenous peoples, limited 
expansion of the community and impoverishment 
resulting from the loss of their livelihood. For instance, 
Diamond mining at Mobilong in South-Eastern Cameroon 
has created a lifestyle change for local peoples as the 
company has been making great use of the fauna as 
nutrition for their workers, taking away from the Baka’s 
food sources (Ibid., p.40).
Today, the Baka have been restricted by zoning 
and are no longer allowed to wander freely into their 
former hunting grounds which are now the logging and 
mining companies’ domains (Ibid., p.36). Under the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, the current situation the Baka face seems to be 
contradictory. Under Article 26, indigenous peoples have 
the right to land, territory and resources which they have 
traditionally possessed and resided in. Article 29 declares 
that indigenous peoples have the right to preservation and 
protection of their environment as it is used for production 
of resources.
At this point, the Baka have had none of these rights 
met. They are not invited to meetings to discuss their 
involvement and rights in regards to the reserves, mining 
and logging activities occurring on their territory. Failure 
to implement this declaration which has been approved by 
the head of state reemphasizes the lack of communication 
by the government and the indifference and inability 
to implement laws (Ibid., p.37). Even under the United 
Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, States are 
called upon to protect and encourage customary use 
of biological resources in accordance with traditional 
cultural practices that are compatible with conservation or 
sustainable use requirements24.
2.1.2.4 Lack of Employment
There are concerns about the inability of the government 
in addressing rising youth unemployment in their 
community. They attribute the rising unemployment issues 
to the loss of their lands which have been taken. With no 
24 See Article 10 (c) and (d).
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alternative livelihood avenues, they are left jobless with 
nothing to support their families. They have accused the 
government and companies of contributing to the current 
social and economic deprivation and doing nothing 
“meaningful” about it. Displacement and resettlement 
without alternative jobs greatly compromise their 
means of livelihood. It is important to enable displaced 
people obtain job opportunities, stimulation packages 
and incentives to encourage business toward alternative 
livelihood schemes and enhancing skills acquisition. 
Efforts should be made to ascertain the peculiarities and 
the implementation of such schemes to ensure that they 
are responsive to local conditions and self-sustainable 
(Mensah & Okyere, 2014, p.95).
2.1.2.5 Financial Compensation Problems
Conflict also results from the fact that compensation 
concerning the loss of lands and revenues from resource 
exploitation are never given the much needed due 
consideration. Provision for sub national revenue 
allocation in the mining and forestry sectors raises 
hope as such royalty payments constitute the best way 
local communities can benefit from natural resource 
exploitation. The 1994 law on forestry25, wildlife and 
fisheries introduced AFR payments to local communities. 
But studies conclude that the outcome from revenue 
allocated to local communities is mediocre (Bamenjo, 
2011, p.2). For instance, the modalities for the allocation 
of the share of mining royalty for local population 
discussed above are bleak.
There is opaque management of revenue: local revenue 
management committees are ineffective, minorities 
are sidelined, and there is limited capacity in local 
communities and lack of control and sanctions (Ibid., 
p.14). The prospects remain bleak until major governance 
challenges are overcome. The Baka of Ampaya village, 
near the Mobilong diamond site, expressed dissatisfaction 
with their representation in the local AFR management 
committee. Based upon interviews, each village expressed 
the desire to have their own revenue management 
committee with a separate bank account (as opposed to 
creating one committee to manage royalties for all seven). 
The Baka indigenous community was particularly insistent 
that they have their own committee since they have not 
benefited from AFR payments (Nodem, Bamenjo, & 
Schwartz, 2012, p.59).
Highlighting discrimination in the benefit sharing 
arrangements under the existing 1994 Forest Law and 
associated legislation under which indigenous peoples 
are overlooked and excluded in favour of dominant Bantu 
communities, the Special Rapporteur on the right to food 
has for example noted the following: 
As for the distribution of forest royalties, it must be borne in 
mind that the sedentary Bantu communities do not represent the 
25 Law no. 94/01 of 20 January 1994 on forestry, wildlife and 
fisheries.
interests of all the local communities that may be affected by 
exploitation activities. The interests of the Pygmies deserve and 
require specific representation. (United Nations Expert Group, 
2006, p.18)
Financial compensation is often less adequate and 
can hardly sustain a family for a week. The questions 
which need clarification are: what is the appropriate level 
of compensation? Is it arrived at through negotiations 
and agreement by all concerned parties or is it singly 
determined by one party? The question whether the legal 
framework in the natural resource sector is appropriate 
to convert natural resource royalties to benefits for local 
communities is timely and begs for an answer.
2.1.2.6 Resettlement Problems 
There is the need to create resettlement plans and packages 
which details out the procedures and mechanisms for 
tackling the complexities. Apparently, the resettled 
areas do not have the same conditions and facilities as 
previously inhabited areas. This necessitates the need 
to provide all relevant social services and facilities to 
support their wellbeing in the newly inhabited places. 
Each concerned stakeholder must fulfill all its obligations 
in the resettlement plans. NGOs should work as advocate 
and mouthpiece of indigenous peoples in bringing the 
issue to the forefront of political and social discussions 
across national, regional and international fora.
In this complication of lack of transparency, the Baka 
are too frightened to venture into their hunting territory. 
The foreigners and the government either completely 
ignore them or arrest them for killing and eating animals 
they have been eating for centuries (Steven, 2015, p.22). 
When posed the question of potential problems with 
effects of mining on the Baka, a high-level administrator 
in the mining sector responded, 
There is no problem. People want to create problems. People 
want to shout and do not give any help to those pygmies, they 
just shout. There is no problem. They want development, they 
want like everyone else. Bring development, doesn’t talk, and 
don’t talk too much. There is no problem.26
Perhaps the most important aspect of mitigating 
conflicts over natural resource exploitation in Central 
Africa is ensuring that it takes place regardless of whether 
a country is at peace, preparing for war, or engaged in 
conflict. The misuse of natural resource revenue means 
that the indigenous population is not experiencing the full 
benefits of its country’s natural wealth. The Baka People 
in Eastern Cameroon may not be at conflict or war in the 
technical sense of those words; it is nonetheless anarchic 
and riddled with claims that stem from the fact that natural 
resource revenue has not benefited them.
2.2 What Major Difficulties Need to Be Overcome 
in Central Africa?
26 Interview, Confidential, Yaoundé, 22/10/09, cited by F. Steven, op. 
cit., p.22.
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2.2.1 Power Inequality, Transparency, Accountability 
and Governance Challenges
The arena within which indigenous communities on 
the one hand and governments/companies on the other 
hand interrelate is not a level playing field. There exists 
an enormous power inequality as governments and 
companies wield economic, legal and political powers 
as compared to indigenous communities who normally 
are considered peripheral in the process and often have 
to resort to advocacy groups and civil society. It is 
necessary to ensure that there is an adequate community 
representation at all levels of political and administrative 
decision-making within the natural resource sector 
(Mensah & Okyere, 2014, p.93).
Governments’ control of important resources and 
the revenues that flow from those resources goes hand-
in-hand with endemic corruption, a culture of impunity, 
weak rule of law, and inequitable distribution of resources 
(Ganesan & Vines, 2015, p.3). These factors often lead 
to governments with unaccountable power that routinely 
commit human rights abuses; prolonging armed conflicts 
(Ibid.). Researchers sometimes refer to these governments 
as “Predatory Autocracies,” where: state power faces few 
constraints and the exploitation of resources for the gain 
of elite interests is institutionalized (Ibid.).
There is the need for transparency in collection, 
allocation and spending of royalties; the need to respond 
to the specific needs of indigenous people and reinforcing 
the capacity of the local management committees 
(Bamenjo, 2011, p.16). Companies have a role to play. 
They should voluntarily endeavour to publish their 
payments to governments27. Royal Dutch/Shell has begun 
to do this in Nigeria, but many companies resist voluntary 
disclosure out of fear of antagonizing host governments. 
Although corporate disclosure without government 
disclosure may not yield full transparency, it would 
definitely enhance transparency. At a minimum, disclosure 
would allow interested parties to determine different 
sources of revenue in order to begin to determine how it is 
spent (Ganesan & Vines, 2015, p.13). 
2.2.2 Polit ical  Will  for Responsible Resource 
Extraction
There is the weakness of political and corporate 
governance. The major theatres of conflict coincidentally 
are countries that have poor administrative capacity to 
regulate the natural resource sector (United Nations 
Expert Group, 2006, p.12). In practice, responsibilities 
for social impacts are often regarded rather loosely by 
both enterprises and governments (Szablowski, 2007, 
p.51). Closely related to the above is the nature of 
27 EITI obliges them to do this. In May 2013, the EITI board adopted 
a new EITI standard in order to move from the process that only 
encourages publishing company payments and government receipts 
from extractive industries to a process that encourages improved 
governance of the extractive industry sector.
ownership rights in Africa. Owing to the dysfunctional 
nature of political systems in many African countries, 
many private actors, including the private citizenry and 
ethnic groups who inhabit regions with natural resource 
deposits, often engage in conflict on the strength of their 
perceived ownership of such resources. This brings to 
light the centrality of property rights issues in natural 
resource politics (United Nations Expert Group, 2006, 
p.12). Although arm conflict may not have occurred 
in Cameroon, the continuous violation of the rights of 
indigenous peoples such as the Baka peoples would 
eventually lead to conflict if the necessary policies on the 
protection of their rights are not crafted and implemented.
What makes resource exploitation responsible is that 
it sets out to avoid risk factors. A “do-no-harm code” for 
resource extraction prioritizes the following: it avoids 
feeding corruption and uneven development – because 
that will weaken institutions, deepen inequalities and 
undermine social well-being; it respects the rights of 
catchment communities (Network of Global Agenda 
Councils, 2013, p.51). What drives this process forward 
is a national consensus, among political, business, 
indigenous communities and civic society leaders that 
the country’s interests are best served by responsibility, 
regulation and respect for human rights. It involves 
widespread consultation as a social process, discussing 
options and choices, shaping policies and actions in 
ways that meet the widest range of interests. This helps 
decreases the likelihood of deepening inequalities, and 
helps keep expectations realistic. It also involves an 
emphasis on sharing benefits between social groups; with 
strategic social investment and job creation (Ibid.).
Admittedly, establishing the policy, legal and 
institutional framework to effectively manage natural 
resources and to ensure that, indigenous people rips 
benefits all take time and political will. Knowing what 
these are and making the right choices are among the first 
steps to avoid natural resource driven conflict.
From the  above  d i scuss ions ,  the  fo l lowing 
recommendations have been made. They are aimed at 
strengthening greater community-governments/companies 
interaction, improving natural resource governance, 
mitigating conflicts and making policies more responsive 
to the needs of natural resource catchment communities.
MAIN RECOMMENDATION
Establish a Commission of Experts—“Commission on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples over Natural Resource 
Exploitation” herein referred to as the Commission to 
undertake a comprehensive review of conflicts relating 
to natural resource governance in Africa. Members of 
the Commission should consist of officials of Africa 
regional institutions and organizations such as the African 
Commission on Human Rights, the African Court of 
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Human Rights, and representatives of indigenous peoples, 
etc., comprising of persons of high moral standing, 
impartial and competent with recognized professional 
reputes. 
The mandate of the Commission should be to 
undertake a field trip to these communities to pursue 
the dialogue on the theme, identify the claims of the 
peoples, and to find lasting solutions for the effective 
implementation of the rights of these populations. This, 
the Commission will do by visiting and organizing 
meetings during which the Commission gets abreast with 
the problems of the peoples. At the end of the exercise, 
the Commission will draw up a report to be submitted to 
the African Commission on Human Rights which should 
be empowered to coordinate the work of the former. Upon 
reviewing the report, the African Commission on Human 
Rights will again empower the Commission to concert 
with the indigenous peoples on the projects they would 
like to receive in return for the exploitation of natural 
resources on their ancestral lands. The projects shall be 
agreed upon in order of importance. The Commission 
shall present the projects to the African Commission on 
Human Rights which shall forward same together with 
the first report to the respective governments who upon 
receiving and concerting with the African Commission on 
Human Rights disburse royalties allocated to indigenous 
peoples to the Commission. The latter will oversee and 
supervise the execution of these projects.
OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS
●  Adopt appropriate policies and legislation for the 
protection of the indigenous populations’ rights, 
in particular their rights relating to landownership, 
control of natural resources, and their economic, 
social and cultural rights;
●  Curb rebel financing by timber and mineral 
exploiting companies, promote economic growth 
and social infrastructures in natural resource 
catchment communities;
●  The international community should step up its 
role in demanding that governments manage their 
resources soundly, and insist on compliance with 
the performance of corporate social responsibility to 
be supervised by a joint commission of the African 
Hunan Rights Commission and UN so as to ensure 
that indigenous populations actually enjoys such 
benefits;
●  International  f inancial  inst i tut ions and the 
UN Security Council can refuse to enter into 
programmes wi th  governments  unt i l  more 
transparency is evidenced. They can insist that 
greater transparency in the use of natural resource 
revenues will be a key component of any future 
cooperation with the government;
●  The use of investigative panels to monitor 
mismanagement of resources and related revenues;
●  Periodic evaluation of the progress made and 
the challenges which still remain, possibly by 
representatives of a network of civil society 
organizations of high moral integrity and proven 
competence and devotion;
●  Guarantee protection to civil society organizations 
in the exercise of their mandates as defenders of 
the rights of indigenous peoples in conformity with 
the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights 
Defenders and with the Principles prescribed by the 
African Charter;
●  Ratify the Protocol  to  the African Charter 
establishing the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, and to make the Declaration 
stipulated in Article 34(6) of the said Protocol;
●  A review of the land tenure system with a view 
to guaranteeing the rights of indigenous groups. 
In particular, due account should be taken of the 
requirement that shifts in land use (concessions) 
must take place with the free, prior and informed 
consent of communities;
●  There is the need to create resettlement plans 
and packages which details out the procedures 
and mechanisms for tackling the complexities of 
resettlement. Obviously, the resettled areas do not 
have the same conditions and facilities as previously 
inhabited areas, necessitating the need to provide all 
relevant facilities to support their wellbeing in the 
newly inhabited places;
●  The communities should appoint their  own 
consultants to deal with issues that affect their 
interest;
●  Alternative Livelihoods, Employment, Skills 
Development and the need to strengthen Companies-
Communities Interaction.
CONCLUSION
When unaccountable, resource-rich governments and 
companies ignore the rights of catchment communities 
and prefer to go to war with arm groups who often seek 
control over the same resources because they believe 
they have legitimate claims, pervasive and systematic 
rights abuse of indigenous people is inevitable; fueling 
continued conflicts (Ganesan & Vines, 2015, p.14). 
Owing to this, political will to translate policies on 
the rights of indigenous people into concrete practice 
is inevitable for the mitigation of natural resource-
driven conflicts. This can be supplemented and given 
more force by the international communities. This can 
motivate unaccountable and corrupt governments to be 
more responsible and transparent. Where such pressure is 
lacking, continued conflict and extreme rights abuses of 
indigenous people are the result.
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There are also the need to reform land tenure and 
natural resource laws to give more protection, clarify 
and secure community land and resource rights and the 
corresponding implementation of such reforms. Reforming 
land tenure and natural resource laws; and ensuring their 
effective implementation and enforcement is a continuing 
process that requires the necessary political will, 
sustainable commitments by all concerned stakeholders. It 
should be different from the sad experience of the present 
unjust status quo which exists only on paper and are not 
being translated into concrete practice so as to create 
positive impacts for indigenous peoples.
The Government of Cameroon has commenced 
reform of Cameroon’s land tenure law as well as the legal 
framework on mining, the environment and forestry. These 
reform processes present real opportunities to address the 
discriminatory effects of Cameroon’s natural resource 
laws towards indigenous peoples. Participatory legal 
reforms of Cameroon’s land and natural resource-related 
laws, where indigenous peoples’ voices and interests 
are represented and fully addressed and implementing 
processes of new reforms, are essential for the urgent task 
of eliminating the discrimination faced by indigenous 
catchment communities28. Also, proper management 
of revenues from natural resources requires greater 
transparency and attention for the benefit of catchment 
communities. We hope this contribution provides some 
useful information required for the pressing change in 
the status quo of natural resource governance in Central 
Africa.
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